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Abstract
In this paper we study the influence of economic stability on the level
of corruption in a country, where high stability is defined as a low level of
variance in economic output growth. We present a political competition
model with exogenous shocks to economic output where politicians can
decide about the level of corruption and an election is held within the
framework of a Bayesian game. Corruption is assumed to be harmful
to the economy and politicians try to maximize income from corrupt
activities as well as the probability of getting reelected. We show that
independent of the absolute size of economic output growth a low de-
gree of economic stability yields a high level of corruption and vice versa.
Thus we conclude that not only does corruption influence economic ac-
tivity, but also the opposite effect might exist, namely that exogenously
caused fluctuations of output influence the readiness of politicians to
behave in a corrupt manner. To support our theoretical findings we ad-
ditionally carry out a cross-country empirical analysis of GDP growth
variance and corruption and come to results confirming our thesis.
Keywords and Phrases: Corruption, Political Competition, Bayesian
Game, Cross Country Study on Corruption
JEL-Classification: D72, D73, D83
1 Introduction
There is almost no country which has not been hit by some sort of cor-
ruption at some time of its history. Even today, where corruption no longer
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appears to play a mayor role in western economies, no one would claim that
it has been totaly defeated. For developing and transition countries things are
much worse. Corruption is more pervasive there and in some countries it is
blamed for having a severe negative impact on economic activity. This impact
of corruption on growth and stability is widely studied in the literature but
as far as we know there is little work yet in the opposite direction, i.e. in
examining the influence of the economic (in)stability of a country on the level
of corruption.
In this paper we present and test a model addressing this gap. Therefore we
set up a two period model of political competition with asymmetric information
and two types of politicians, where incumbents have to decide about the level of
corruption and economic output is affected by their decision. We will show that
in a Bayesian equilibrium, the incumbent chooses a higher level of corruption
if the variance of economic output is high and a lower level if it is low. Also
we will show that high levels of corruption are more likely if regular legal
remunerations for being in office are low. Thus we conclude that a high level
of economic instability should foster corruption and we present an empirical
test of our suggestion.
The paper is organized as follows: First we take a look at the related litera-
ture to define the notion of corruption and to track alternative explanations for
the appearance of corruption. Then we present the model in section two and
work through the game and the propositions. Afterwards we run an empirical
test of our model in section three to support our results. A short conclusion
and an outlook end the paper and an appendix discusses a variation of the
model.
1.1 Corruption
Corruption is a more or less prevalent phenomenon in any society that runs
a political apparatus to control the allocation and distribution of limited re-
sources, rights and claims within its economic system. Whenever the control of
public decision makers by the society either by direct observation or by moral
norms is not absolute, there is room for the former to behave opportunisti-
cally and to take inefficient or unjust decisions in exchange for payments or
other grants from the privileged parties. The sum of this socially undesirable
behavior is what we call corruption in our paper.
To get a better understanding of the types of corruption and how they might
lead to inefficient outcomes, we follow Rose-Ackerman (1999) and distinguish
five genres of corruption: 1. Bribes to equate differences in supply and demand
stemming from legal restrictions: In this case bribes raise the price of a good in
excess demand and with fixed supply until demand is lowered to the available
amount of supply. Therefore some rents are transferred and pocketed by the
corrupt official. Inefficiency occurs if the considered party is different from the
one with the highest valuation. 2. Bribes as incentive payments are payed
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when it depends on the goodwill of officials whether demanded work is done
fast or slow ("speed money"). Alternatively bribes may be payed to slow down
the work of officials concerning competitors. The second case is sometimes
even more "effective" for the bribing party, as it is often easier for an official
to slow down a process than to accelerate it. Inefficiency results from wrong
incentives and the creation of additional "road blocks" by officers to increase
their veto power. 3. Bribes to lower costs. This means that an official is payed
to be indulgent when controlling for example safety standards. The inefficiency
might result from ignoring external effects that have been internalized by laws.
4. Bribes to obtain limited concessions which otherwise would have been sold
in an auction or a beauty contest. This leads to misallocation if not all parties
have the same readiness to bribe. Otherwise the result would be the same
as in an auction, but rents would go to the official and not to the state.
5. Bribes to buy political influence and votes. Here lobbies pay bribes to
politicians so as to strengthen their position. In a broader way one could
also put politicians’ favors to special interest groups in exchange for votes or
campaign contributions into this category.
Whereas probably hardly anybody doubted the negative effects of corrup-
tion in practice, from a theoretical point of view it was not clear for a long
time whether corruption is really that distortionary. Some economists (see for
example Leff (1964) or Huntington (1968) ) even defended the use of bribery as
an efficient, welfare enhancing mechanism. The first argument was that bribes
provide a motivation for officers to work harder in so far as they act at a piece
rate. They also claimed that "speed money" avoids bureaucratic delays and
bribes for concessions work as an auction-like allocation device, where scarce
resources are given to the parties with the highest valuation and thus the high-
est bribe offer. According to this school bribes should have no more negative
effects on the economy than other transfers, for example taxes. Interesting as it
is, this theory falls short of the fact that the access to such a bribe-driven mar-
ket could very likely differ for various demanding parties either for differences
in moral considerations or for different levels of trustworthiness, connections
to officers and available information. It also ignores the negative incentives
for officers induced by corruption, as they might try to strengthen their po-
sition by setting up additional hurdles. From a contract-theory perspective,
bribe "contracts" have the disadvantage of not being enforceable by the trade
partners.
Shleifer and Vishny argue that corruption is more costly than taxation be-
cause of the secrecy premise, i.e. the necessity to hide away corrupt activities
from the public and the law. The secrecy premise thus allocates resources for
setting up and covering secure information channels (see Shleifer and Vishny
(1993)). Other empirical and theoretical studies as from the United Nations
(1989) or from Klitgaard (1991) confirm the suspicion that corruption is a
wasteful activity and should be banned wherever possible. Another implica-
tion of Leff and Huntington’s theory is that corruption should especially exert
its pretended positive effect in inefficient bureaucratic environments. This
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argument can be cancelled out by a empirical study by Mauro (1995), who
shows that the correlation between growth and corruption is far from being
significantly different in countries with highly efficient and with less efficient
bureaucracies, whereas according to Leff and Huntington growth should be
closer correlated to corruption in less efficient bureaucracies, because they
should work better with the "help" of corruption. In our paper we stick to
the view of corruption as a "bad" activity, as we refer to a negative effect of
corruption on economic output in a common way.
In the terms of informational economics, corruption could be seen as a
principal agent problem with the society as the principal and the politicians
and officers as the agents. Under asymmetric information about the agents’
actions there is no way to provide perfect incentives without handing over
the entire surplus to them. Fixed remunerations and benefits given, only
transparency and monitoring (reduction of asymmetry), means of punishment
(deterrence), or some "moral codex" (altering of the agent’s utility function)
can reduce the level of corruption.
All points play an important role in the determination of the levels of cor-
ruption observed in reality. For example the means of control should be higher
in societies with a high level of democracy and free media than in autocratic
countries with suppressed media. Also the society in autocratic systems has
fewer possibilities to punish decision makers than in democracies. The model
of Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) addresses this point and thus claims that
corruption should be higher in autocratic systems.
But even in the most autocratic society the people has a possibility to
discipline the government - for example by threatening a revolution. Of course
this threat is quite poor and probably less effective than the possible sanctions
in a democratic country. Still it may play a role in the behavior of corrupt
decision makers in autocratic countries and could well bound away the level
of corruption from the maximum level. And as the level of corruption differs
widely both among autocratic and among democratic countries, the degree of
democratization cannot be the sole determinant of corruption.
The last point, the differences in moral norms, certainly also plays an im-
portant role in the explanation of corruption. Some even consider it to be
the main reason for degree of corruption and claim that the effects of different
constitutions and economic circumstances are negligible compared to those
of different social norms. Bardhan (1997) gives an example of the different
views of corruption by Westerners and Asians. The former perceive the reg-
ular "baksheesh" payments in Asian countries as corrupt, whereas the latter
find the high degree of monetarization even in personal transactions in west-
ern countries corrupt. The differences could be explained by the comparatively
high level of individualization in western societies and by the long tradition of
mutual gift exchange at all levels of society in many Asian countries.
Even if they sound somewhat tautological, it has to be admitted that expla-
nations related to cultural differences are capable to explain differences in the
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level of corruption even within one country or society, for example between
northern and southern Italy. Other theories and examples of this type are
provided by Putnam (1993) for Italy, by Yang (1989) for the Chinese society
and by others.
However, in our opinion cultural differences rather enforce existing tenden-
cies of corruption stemming from the principal agent relationship, than being
the sole source of it. An argument supporting this view is that there are many
counter examples where culturally related areas show huge differences in the
level of corruption (e.g. Singapore compared to Malaysia or Indonesia, or many
examples where corruption differs between urban and rural areas within one
cultural homogenous region).
Because corruption seems to be much more common in developing and
poor countries, many studies concentrated on the connection of corruption
and growth. It is argued that economies with low output and slow growth are
more susceptible to corruption because the controlling power of the executive
is weak and people on all levels of societies are in great need for extra incomes.
Further ideas concerning the corruption-growth relationship are highlighted
for example by Ehrlich and Lui (1999) or by DelMonte and Papagani (2001).
Mauro (1995) looks for empirical evidence in this direction, and finds a negative
association between perceived corruption and the investment rate in a cross-
country study. The intuition is that it is expensive and risky to invest in highly
corrupt countries, and therefore growth should be low, whereas the resulting
poverty fosters corruption even further and so on.
But on the other hand, Bardhan (1997) points out that it can not simply be
inferred that low economic growth is the only source for corruption, as there are
many cases where corruption is rising sharply although growth is relatively high
and incomes are rising. Many of the eastern European transition economies
as well as some south-east Asian states fall into this category.
These examples also contradict the argument of many liberal economists
that corruption is spawned by regulatory states because the level of corruption
increased substantially after market reforms in recent years for example in
post-communist Russia or China.
Other models stress the idea that corruption shows a sort of a reinforcing
effect, i.e. that it pays more to be corrupt when everybody else is. Thus
corruption is expected to spread fast once a certain critical level is reached
and on the other hand it should be difficult to introduce corruption in an
extremely clean country. For example Andvig and Moene (1990) come to this
result in their model by pointing out that for a corrupt officer it is cheaper
to get detected by a corrupt superior than by a clean one. Rasmusen and
Ramseyer (1994) support this view of corruption as a collective action problem
with the results of another model.
The intuition of this theory is quite appealing as it is easy to imagine that
a newly installed and so far innocent officer in Bangladesh is more likely to
accept a bribe than one in Finland. Nevertheless it fails in describing how the
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level of corruption was able to reach this critical point in some countries and
not in others.
Hence there are some interesting and plausible approaches to the phe-
nomenon of corruption, most of them addressing cultural, constitutional or
economic differences between countries and some of them relating growth and
wealth to the level of corruption. Yet none of the theories can fully explain
corruption and as far as we know none examined the relationship between
economic (in)stability and corruption. Our model wants to address this gap
and show why it is plausible to think of economic instability as a possible ad-
ditional source of corruption.
To investigate this issue we define stability as the amplitude of economic
output growth around a long term drift rate. A country with a low variance
of output growth (i.e. a relatively monotone output path) is called stable, one
with a high variance (i.e. a relatively non-monotonic output path) is called
unstable. The stability of output enters exogenously in our model, and one
can think of it as being an effect of the state of the world economy, exchange
rates, foreign relationships, prices of raw materials, internal frictions from
reorganization processes, natural disasters and the like. The idea of output
stability being exogenous is supported by a paper of Easterly et al. (1993),
where they find that most of the variation in growth rates is due to random
shocks and not to some special policy.
2 The model
For this paper we use a two period political competition model where an
incumbent can decide on the level of corruption and faces some elections1 at
the end of the first period.
2.1 Model Structure
There are two periods t = 1 and t = 2 and two possible levels of corruption
in each period, lt ∈ {l, l¯}, lt = l = 0 means there will be "no corruption" in
1Basically the instrument of election is only a democratic device to discipline politicians.
If one thinks about the threat of revolution being a disciplining device in autocratic countries,
as mentioned above, one can expand our model even to non democratic countries. The
"election" there would be the decision whether to revolt or not. Of course the disciplining
effect of a threat of revolution should be small due to the high private costs of such a
revolution, but in a different context Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) show in a quite elegant
model how this threat can suffice to cause the ruling elite of an autocratic country to extend
the franchise in order to calm the people. Similarly the ruling class might restrict corruption
in our model to keep the people quiet.
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period t and lt = l¯ means that a high level of corruption is chosen in period t.2
Definition of Players
There are two types of politicians, a "good" one (θ = g) and a "bad" one
(θ = b).
The overall utility function of politicians is
UP = τ1(u0 + aθl1) + τ2δ(u0 + aθl2) (1)
τt indicates whether P is in office in period t (τt = 1) or not (τt = 0). u0 is the
"base" utility or ego-rent of being in office, i.e. the salary, social status and so
on. This utility is fixed and cashed in for certain in every period the politician
is in office. The "good" politician derives negative utility from being corrupt,
as he might feel guilty or fear punishment, i.e. he will stick to his promise
not to be corrupt. The bad politician does not care about external effects
or morality considerations and gets direct positive utility from a high level of
corruption. In the model this is expressed by ag < 0 and ab > 0. ag and ab
denote the gains-factor from corruption for good respectively bad politicians.
All politicians are drawn from a large pool of politicians, where pi is the frac-
tion of "good" politicians in this pool. Future utility is discounted by δ.
The incumbent I of period 1 has to decide on the level of corruption l1 in
period 1 and on the level of corruption l2 in period 2 for the case that he gets
reelected.
Citizens derive utility UV only from the performance of the economy, which
is measured by economic output e. It is assumed that they all have strictly
monotonic utility functions in output, so UV (e′) > UV (e) ⇔ e′ > e. Thus,
citizens can be modelled by a representative voter V with utility function UV .
The only action the representative citizen takes is to vote at the end of period
1. Then, V can decide whether to confirm I in office or to elect a challenger C.
C is the challenger that is drawn out of the pool of politicians to face I in
the election. If he gets elected he will be in office in period 2, therefore his
only action is to set a level of corruption in period 2 if he is elected.
Economic Stability
2The level of corruption chosen can be thought of as the degree of the incumbent being
corrupt himself or allowing his subordinate officers to be corrupt. If an incumbent decides
to turn a blind eye on corruption in the governmental apparatus he will benefit from this by
getting stronger support by his officers. In the other case, when he decides on low corruption
he will not only loose the direct income of corruption, but his life will get harder because
it is likely that support from his officers is lower when they experience stricter controls for
their actions. Therefore in this model only the decision of the incumbent is considered and
the officers are supposed to follow the decision of the government.
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The economic output defines the voter’s utility and is crucial as a signal
about I’s policy in period 1. The voter observes the change in economic out-
put directly by comparing his utility at the beginning and at the end of period
1. However, the change in economic output is affected by three factors. First
there is a drift rate d determining the long term growth rate of the economy.
d is of no importance for the model itself but nevertheless we keep it for the
empirical part. Second there is an exogenous shock s to the economy. s brings
in the variance of output. Third we assume a negative impact of corruption
on the performance of the economy. Therefore the change in economic output
e is modelled as follows:
∆e = d+ s− l (2)
s has mean zero and is distributed with one of two possible density functions
h(·) which have either high or low variance, where high and low variance of s
are equally likely. For the computation of the equilibrium we assume h(a, b) to
be a uniform distribution on the interval [a; b] in the remainder of the model:
3
s ∼ h(−e˜,+e˜) with e˜ ∈ {e, e¯}, p(e˜ = e) = p(e˜ = e¯) = 1
2
(3)
e˜ = e stands for a relatively "stable" economy, i.e. shocks are comparatively
small, whereas e˜ = e¯ denotes an "unstable" economy which suffers large shocks
to economic outcome. Think of a stable economy for example of a well diver-
sified one, whereas an unstable economy could be a country highly dependent
on one export good with large price fluctuations. We assume that l¯ < 2e, i.e.
the influence of the exogenous shock on the economy is not too small compared
to the influence of corruption.
Information Structure
There are two types of uncertainty which the citizen is facing when making
his electoral decision.
First the level of l1 chosen by I cannot be directly observed by the citizen. It
is assumed that corruption mostly takes place between government and only
a few of the citizens in special positions, e.g. firm managers, lobbyists etc.
Therefor the great majority does not know whether much or little corruptive
activity is executed by the government.
However politicians and citizens observe e˜ at the beginning of period 1,
as they know whether they live in a "stable" or "unstable" economy. Thus
citizens know the maximum amplitude of the shock s, but they do not know
its actual size. Also citizens naturally can observe their own utility after e
incarnates. Uncertain of the origin of an income shock, they only can calculate
3in the appendix, a version of the model with a more natural normally distributed shock
to economic output is discussed. Unfortunately this leads to some computational problems
due to the characteristics of the normal distribution function.
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probabilities for the chosen size of l1. Thus e acts as a noisy signal about the
action of I.
Second the types of I and C are not known a priori, but both have an initial
reputation of being of "good" type denoted by αI and αC , i.e. αi = p(θ(i) = g),
i ∈ {I, C}. αI and αC are independent of actual types and are drawn from
the same cumulative distribution function F . F is common knowledge.
The Game
The players of the game are the incumbent, the citizen and the challenger.
The timing of the game is as follows:
First, nature chooses the type of the incumbent θ(I), which is only observed
by the incumbent I. Then, nature chooses e˜, which is observed by all players.
Now, I must choose l1, and nobody except herself knows her choice. Nature
then draws s with p(s = x) = h(x) and s− l1 is computed as the net output,
as we set d = 0 in the theoretical model. s− l1 is observed by all players.
After the citizen and the incumbent receive their first-period utilities, an elec-
tion is held, and the former has to choose between the incumbent I and the
challenger C based on his beliefs about θ(I) and on αC . C is drawn by nature
from the pool of politicians (and only himself knows his type) and as men-
tioned above his initial reputation is drawn from F .
The winner of the election then chooses the second period l2. Payoffs are re-
alized and the game ends.
A strategy for the incumbent is the pair l := (l1, l2) of decision rules about
the degree of corruption in the first and (if reelected) the second period. I’s
choice is dependent on her type θ(I) and the state of the world e˜.
A strategy for the challenger is the decision rule l2 if he is elected for the second
period. His choice is dependent only on his type θ(C).
A strategy for the citizen is the voting decision rule v that specifies whether
he votes for I (v = I) or C (v = C). The choice is dependent on his beliefs
βI(e) about the incumbent’s type after observing her initial reputation αI and
the signal e and on the challenger’s initial reputation αC . V compares αC and
βI and chooses the candidate with the higher value. Thus the probability for
I to get reelected is F (βI).
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a set of optimal strategies
for I, C and V and of consistent beliefs of the citizen about I’s type.
It must satisfy the following properties:
• I chooses l such that l(θ(I)) = argmaxlEUP
• C chooses l2 such that l2(θ(C)) = argmaxl2(u0 + aθl2)
• V chooses a voting rule v such that v = argmaxvEUV where V ’s second
period utility is dependent on the type of the elected politician v
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• V ’s posterior belief about I’s type after observing the signal e, βI(e) =
p(θ(I) = g | e) is derived by updating using Bayes’ rule and is consistent
2.2 Equilibrium
As we face a two period game, we can solve it by backward induction.
Proposition 1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as defined above, a "good"
incumbent chooses l2 = l, a "bad" one l2 = l.
Proof
In the second period the behavior of the politician in power is clear. She
does not have to worry about being reelected and will simply maximize her
second period utility u0+aθl2. This leads to l2 = l for a < 0 ("good" politician
in power) and to l2 = l for a > 0 ("bad" politician in power).4
2
In the first period, a "good" incumbent maximizes her expected utility. Her
behavior will obviously depend on citizens’ beliefs.
To rule out equilibria based on unnatural out of equilibrium beliefs, such as
"a low level of e indicates a low l1" which could lead to self fulfilling equilibria
where even good politicians play l1 = l, we concentrate on equilibria with
monotonic beliefs of citizens. This refinement was first used by Coate and
Morris (1995) for situations where other refinements such as the equilibrium
dominance argument by Cho and Kreps (1987) cannot be applied because of
the noisy character of the signal. Basically it means that a higher economic
output is believed to be produced more likely by a "good" politician and thus
l1 = 0 with a higher probability as if a low economic output is observed.
Formally: e′ > e ⇒ β(e′) ≥ β(e), other things held constant. This concept
sounds rather plausible in our case, as citizens know about "bad" politician’s
preferences and their negative impact on output. For further discussion see
Coate and Morris (1995).
Proposition 2 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with monotonic beliefs as
defined above, a "good" incumbent chooses l1 = l.
4Here we have an endgame effect, which allows us to solve the game by backward induc-
tion. However this assumption is not too unrealistic. First, many countries restrict the time
for higher politicians to be in office, and second every politician faces a limited lifespan and
an increasing probability of dying in each period, which should lead to the same results in a
multi period game. Empirically it would be interesting to test whether corruption activities
rise the closer incumbents get to their last possible period in office, in which - as in our 2nd
period - they do not have to care about reelections anymore.
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Proof
Under the assumption of monotonic beliefs both the direct utility from
engaging in corruption decreases because ag < 0, and the chance of getting
reelected is non-increasing, thus the "good" incumbent will choose l1 = l.
2
Foreseeing this, citizens prefer to have a good politician in office in the
second period, which would result in a higher expected level of e. Therefore
they will vote for the candidate whom they consider to be good with a higher
probability, thus v = I ⇔ βI(e) ≥ αC . Starting from their prior belief αI they
form βI(e) as follows:
βI(e) =
αIp(s− l = e | θ(I) = g)
αIp(s− l = e|θ(I) = g) + (1− αI)p(s− l = e|θ(I) = b) (4)
=
αIhl(e)
αIhl(e) + (1− αI)hl(e)
(5)
where hl(e) is the density function of e if l1 = l and hl(e) is the density for
e if l1 = l. hl(e) and hl(e) are similar to the distribution function h of s but
shifted by l resp. l to the left. For the case of uniformly distributed s this
leads to
βI(e) =

0 if e ∈ [−e˜− l; e˜[ ,
αI if e ∈ [−e˜; e˜− l] ,
1 if e ∈]e˜− l; e˜] .
(6)
In this case there is either no learning or full revelation of I’s type.5 For
e < −e˜ − l and e > e˜ beliefs are not defined but these cases cannot occur in
the model, so this beliefs can be set to any value.6
The incumbent’s first period behavior is determined by the maximization
of I’s overall expected utility which in turn depends both on I’s choice of l1
and on the citizen’s belief. For a "good" incumbent it was easy to show that
l1 = l under monotonic beliefs, as both direct utility and the probability of
getting reelected are decreasing in l1. For the case of being "bad", I has to
make a tradeoff between increasing his income in the first period by choosing
l1 = l as ab > 0 and maximizing the probability of being reelected to get in
favor of second period incomes by choosing l1 = l. To find his actual behavior,
5Again, see the appendix for a case with imperfect revelation of types. Anyway, this is
only a matter of "elegance", as uniformly distributed shocks perfectly suffice to describe the
effect under consideration.
6Note that the citizens can only punish the incumbent by voting her out of office and
deprive her of second period benefits. However, if they could punish her arbitrarily hard, it
would be possible to implement the first best, as there are cases where V can be sure that
he is facing a bad politician.
Corruption in an unstable environment 12
we have to maximize overall expected utility as stated in equation (1), given
that the citizen updates his beliefs according to equation (6).
If I’s decision is l1 = l for θ(I) = b, then we are in a pooling equilibrium, where
behavior does not depend on I’s type, if I’s decision is l1 = l¯ for θ(I) = b, we
are in a separating equilibrium, where the good politician stays clean and the
bad one fosters corruption.
2.3 Impact of Stability
While solving for the optimal first period behavior of "bad" incumbents,
we come to the main topic of the paper, the question of whether the stability
of an economy will have any impact on the degree of corruption within this
country. To answer this question we set up a Lemma and several additional
propositions.
Lemma 1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with monotonic beliefs as defined
above, an incumbent I with θ(I) = b chooses l1 = l⇔ δ(u0ab + l) > e˜.
Proof
The incumbent maximizes her expected payoff as follows:
l(θ(I)) = argmaxlEUP (θ(I), l)
Thus, an incumbent with θ(I) = g chooses l1 = l. An incumbent with θ(I) = b
chooses l1 such that
l1 = argmaxl1E(u0 + abl1 + p(v = I)δ(u0 + abl)) (7)
= argmaxl1E(u0 + abl1 + F (β(e))δ(u0 + abl))
= argmaxl1E(abl1 +
∫ e˜
−e˜−l
β(e) de δ(u0 + abl))
(8)
So, l1 = l if and only if
EUP (l1 = l) > EUP (l1 = l) ⇔ (9)
∫ e˜
−e˜−l
(
p(e|l1 = l)β(e|l1 = l)− p(e|l1 = l)β(e|l1 = l)
)
de >
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
Corruption in an unstable environment 13
Equation (9) states the general condition for a low corruption choice for
an arbitrary density function h(·) of shocks s. For the case of uniformly dis-
tributed prior beliefs α and uniformly distributed shocks s this yields:
l1 = l⇔ 1
2e˜
(
pi(2e˜− l) + l − pi(2e˜− l)
)
>
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
⇔ 1
2e˜
>
ab
δ(u0 + abl)
⇔ δ
2
(
u0
ab
+ l) > e˜ (10)
2
Lemma 1 states the condition for a "bad" incumbent to behave properly
in the first period. The probability to do so increases in δ as this leads to a
higher valuation of second period payoffs and thus gives an incentive to stay
in office, and the probability to get reelected can be maximized by abstain
from corruption. Clearly, increasing u0 also has a positive impact on behaving
properly in the first period, as it rises the payoff in the second period and thus
the incentive to get reelected. Interestingly, rising the volume of corruption,
namely l has the same effect of lowering the incentive of first period corruption,
though it affects both periods. Obviously, the disadvantage from the dimin-
ished reelection probability overweighs the advantage of higher first period
gains. This issue will be discussed below Corollary 1. Increasing ab rises the
willingness to engage in first period corruption, as it increases immediate gains
from corruption more than future gains, which has to be discounted by δ and
the probability of getting reelected. The probability of first period corruption
is also increasing in e˜, as it rises the right hand side of (10).
Proposition 3 For fixed l, ab and δ, there exists a u0 s.t. u0 > u0 ⇒ l1 = 0
for all θ in equilibrium, and u0 = ab(2e˜δ − l).
Proof
Rewriting (10) leads to
u0 > ab(
2e˜
δ
− l)
thus
u0 = ab(
2e˜
δ
− l). (11)
Therefore and because l1 = 0 for θ(I) = g, l1 = 0 for sure if and only if
u0 > u0, other things held constant.
2
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Proposition 3 is a side result of the model and basically states that the amount
of first period corruption is decreasing in the benefits or "wages" of being in
office. This argument that officers are less in need for income from non-legal
activities when they are sufficiently payed is often found in the officials and
politicians salary discussion. u0 is the higher the more impatient politicians
are, because then they increasingly prefer immediate gains from corruption to
future gains from salary.
If we think of non-linear per period utility functions of politicians, the
salary needs to be lower for higher concavity of the utility function, because
politicians then might want to smoothen their income over periods and there-
fore more likely abstain from corruption in period 1. Note that this effect is
affected by saving possibilities. If politicians are able to transfer wealth to
the 2nd period, the critical salary rises because the dependency on constant
income is falling. This plays an important role when thinking about non-
democratic countries. The politician gets additional disciplined by the threat
of revolution if this threat includes a risk of loosing some saved money (be-
cause it is fixed in assets, land, and so on, which can be expropriated in case
of a revolution), hence the lower a politician’s possibilities to save money in
a secure way, the less he will risk to induce a rebellion by behaving too corrupt.
Corollary 1 For fixed ab and δ, the critical "wage" u0 decreases in the size
of l.
Proof
trivial.
2
Corollary 1 appears rather counterintuitive at a first glance. Analogous to
the phenomenon discussed in Lemma 1, it makes the assertion that, other
things held constant, the critical salary to prevent the politician from getting
into corruption decreases when the volume of potential corruptive activities
increases. This is because an increase of volume of corruption leads both to a
higher risk of getting identified as being the corrupt type and loosing second
period gains, and to a higher volume of second period benefits, making it more
desirable to win elections in period 1. Therefore if the volume of corruption
rises, the incumbent has increasing motivation to behave properly in period 1
to preserve his chances to get reelected and to extract the increasing second
period benefits when corruption is riskless. However this only holds true if the
politician has to decide between l and l in a discrete manner as in our model.
An even more interesting fact is that equation (11) contains the variance of
economic output, which brings us to our main proposition, stating the negative
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correlation between output stability and the expected level of corruption within
an economy. For this, we consider a world where the gains for "bad" politicians,
ab, potential corruption volume l and base utility u0 are different for different
economies. More precisely we assume, that the u0 for each country is drawn
out of a distribution that assigns a positive probability mass to the range
[ab(
2e
δ
− l); ab(2eδ − l)].7 Now we can state
Proposition 4 Expected total corruption is monotonically decreasing in out-
put stability.
Proof
Because "good" politicians always choose l1 = l2 = l and "bad" ones always
l2 = l, we can focus on the first period decisions of incumbents with θ(I) = b
and compare them for low and high variance of e:
Clearly, u0(e) > u0(e) for e > e, thus there exists a range [u0(e); u0(e)] with
|[u0(e);u0(e)]| > 0, s.t. for u0 ∈ [u0(e); u0(e)] the "bad" politician chooses
l1 = 0 if e˜ = e and l1 = l if e˜ = e.
As we assumed a positive probability for u0 ∈ [u0(e);u0(e)], the probability
that u0 < u0 (i.e. high first-period corruption) is lower for the more stable
economy. Second-period corruption stays unaffected, hence expected overall
corruption decreases monotonically in output stability. 8
Stated differently, with randomly chosen variables, equation (10) is more
likely to be satisfied if e˜ = e than if e˜ = e.
2
Proposition 4 states our main thesis, i.e. high variance amplifies corruption
and thus the channel between economic stability and corruption does not only
work from corruption to stability but also from stability to corruption. The
intuition for this is that it is easier for politicians to hide their dubious affairs
away in the rather uncertain environment of an unstable economy than in the
more deterministic case of a stable economy.
For a cross country comparison as in the next chapter, this means that the
parameter space that leads to high corruption is larger for countries with low
economic stability. Thus if one assumes that parameters are different between
countries (e.g. u0 or l differs from country to country), one should expect a
negative correlation between output stability and corruption when observing
a larger number of countries.
7This means there are cases where a given u0 would suffice to deter politicians from
corruption in a stable economy (e˜ = e), but not in an unstable one (e˜ = e).
8if we would allow for a choice of l1 out of a continuous set, a bad incumbent would
always choose his optimal level of corruption and the proposition would strengthen to strict
monotonicity.
Corruption in an unstable environment 16
3 Cross Country Study
Of course our model does not prove nor wants to proof that variance of
economic output is the only source of corruption. Nevertheless we want to
look at some empirical evidence confirming our view that it is plausible to
think about instability as one reason for amplifying corruption.
We therefore set up some basic regression models to find the correspond-
ing correlations. Note that we are not able to include a full fedged empirical
analysis in this section, but we rather want to find some indications for the
correctness of our theoretical findings. A more comprehensive breakdown of
this issue is left for future research.
One of the problems when running a cross country regression concerning
corruption is the measurability of corruption. Due to the partly subjective and
secret character of corruption there is hardly any exact measure of corruption
for a given country. Until the mid-1990s most empirical findings concerning
corruption were of a mere anecdotal nature and cross country comparisons were
speculative and theoretical. Corruption was even cited as a classic example of a
phenomenon that was observable but not quantifiable. But later the empirical
research on corruption grew significantly because of increasing international
public and private interest in determining and curbing corruption. Today, most
major surveys use polls to obtain their data. This means that some personal
perception is retained in the data. But for large numbers of observations the
broad picture should at least give a somewhat realistic impression of the level
of corruption in a country.
There are a number of different country risk surveys including ratings of
corruption in there analysis. One is the Index of Business International (BI),
a private firm now integrated in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). It
ranked countries on a range from 1 to 10 in the years 1980-1983 and is used
for example by (Mauro 1995). Another index using a notion of corruption is
the "Civil Rights Index" of Freedom House. It uses a criterium called "Free of
Corruption" and provides data for 192 counties, nevertheless it is problematic
to isolate the actual influence of the corruption criterium on this index value.
Probably the most famous source which tries to rank countries according
to their level of corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Trans-
parency International, which is published yearly in a global corruption report
(Transparency International 2003). Basically it is a survey that subsumes a
larger number of cross country polls, most of which reflect the opinion of people
working for multinational firms and institutions. The original polls are carried
out by NGOs as well as private institutions.9 Thus, they capture the degree of
corruption from a mostly western (but also pretty homogenous) point of view.
The CPI assigns a score between 10 (no corruption) to 0 (severe corruption)
to each country. In our research we use the CPI of 2003 because it seems
9For a comprehensive list of the composition of the CPI, see (Transparency International
2003).
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to provide the most independent and unbiased measure of corruption and is
freely available to the public. Also it benefits from high correlation to most
of the other corruption indices and includes many of them in its composition.10
In order to check for the results of our model we ran some regression models
to match the variance of a countries GDP per capita growth with its CPI value.
The variance in GDP per capita growth is calculated from the cross country
GDP values from the Penn World Table (2001) for the time horizon of 20 years
(1981-2000).11
To illustrate the correlation between GDP growth variance and the CPI
without regard of the underlying causality, we first ran a simple OLS regression
(model (1)) with the CPI as the dependent variable and only the standard
deviation of growth on the explaining side:
CPI = α1 + α2σ (12)
where σ denotes the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth over the
given time horizon.
Graphically the correlation is depicted in figure 1, with the bold line being the
linear trend line of the correlation. Its slope is the highly significant coefficient
from table 1 and suggests a negative correlation between CPI and σ as a styl-
ized fact.12
To get a better understanding of the causality and the impact of σ on CPI,
we set up some larger models. First we specify model (2), which includes
some of the most common explaining variables on corruption additional to σ.
Therefore we include the drift d of the GDP growth rate, the democracy level
of 1995 dem95, the investment level inv as a percentage of GDP, the variable
school as the percentage of age 15+ population in secondary school and the
variable ethno that describes the ethnolinguistic fractionalization of a country.
d is derived from our GDP data, dem95 takes values from 0 to 1 (1 being very
democratic) and is taken from (Barro 1999) to control for democratization
of the countries. inv is from the Penn World Table and school is computed
from the updated (Barro and Lee 2000) dataset on education, both averages
from 1980-2000. Additionally we include the variable protestant as the per-
centage of protestants in a society, the variable import denoting the openness
to trade i.e. the goods and services imported as a percentage of GDP, the
dummy variables formerUK (former British colony or UK) and federal (fed-
eral constitution). Finally we include the variable absgovwage as the absolute
wage of central government members in 1990 US-Dollars. protestant, import,
formerUK and federal are found to explain a large amount of corruption in
10A table of correlation coefficients between the CPI and other corruption indices is given
in (Transparency International 2003).
11Stability seems to be a somewhat persistent phenomenon as calculations with other time
horizons (10, 30) years led to similar results.
12Remember that high CPI-values indicate low corruption.
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Figure 1: Negative correlation between standard deviation of economic
output and CPI in a simple regression
the models of Treisman (2000). absgovwage is included because of its rela-
tion to our theory and is derived from Treisman’s data on relative income of
central government members to GDP per capita which in turn is taken from
(Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee 1997). 13 The coefficients can
be found under model (2) in table 1.
Model (2) seems to explain the CPI very good, with an adjusted R2 =
0.8071.14 Note that we use percentage changes in GDP to calculate the vari-
ance and therefore the standard deviation σ =
√
var(∆GDP ) is normalized.
For low σ, the economy evolved in a relatively "stable" way over the last 20
years, whereas high values of σ indicate an economy with large short term
deviations from the long term drift in economic output growth, hence an "un-
stable" economy in our definition.
The correlation between CPI and σ is negative as expected and the t-
13We do not explicitly enter the absolute level of per capita GDP into the regression as it
turns out that it is highly correlated with the other explaining variables in this regression.
In fact, absolute GDP per capita can be explained by the other independent variables of
model (2) with an R2 = 0.81. If we nevertheless include absolute GPD per capita and use
robust estimation to correct for collinearity, σ still stays significant at the 5%-level. The
same holds true for all following regression models.
14We are aware of the boudedness of our dependent variable, however, as the range is
from 1-10, we still use an OLS model.
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Table 1: Results of OLS regressions
dependent variable: CPI
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of obs. 75 50 62 51 49
σ -0.5674***
(0.1069)
-0.2614**
(0.1142)
-0.2200***
(0.0801)
-0.1946**
(0.0805)
-0.4647***
(0.1526)
d 0.1261
(0.0896)
dem95 1.7283**
(0.6906)
2.0167***
(0.6136)
1.6983**
(0.6784)
1.5532***
(0.7686)
inv 0.0222
(0.0349)
school 0.0171
(0.0213)
0.0649***
(0.0133)
0.0410**
(0.0169)
0.0340*
(0.0178)
ethno -0.0124
(0.0081)
protestant 0.0364***
(0.0085)
0.0306***
(0.0069)
0.0311***
(0.0078)
0.0287***
(0.0079)
formerUK 0.7193*
(0.4230)
import 0.0223**
(0.0091)
0.0342***
(0.0071)
0.0290***
(0.0076)
0.0280***
(0.0075)
federal 0.2433
(0.4779)
absgovwage 0.0436**
(0.0166)
0.0486***
(0.0155)
0.0355**
(0.0168)
constant 1.3895
(0.9369)
0.6414
(0.7143)
0.6248
(0.7007)
2.4281
R2 0.2784 0.8472 0.7878 0.8279 0.8418
adj. R2 0.2685 0.8030 0.7688 0.8045 0.8192
Model (5) uses predictions σˆ from the instrumental regression instead of actual σ-values.
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, * denotes
significance at the 10%-level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Corruption in an unstable environment 20
value indicates a result significant at the 5% level. In model (2) even under
consideration of the many other explanatory variables, σ still has a considerable
impact on CPI. Take for example Cameroon, Uganda and Angola, which can
be found on places 73, 72 and 67 out of 75 regarding the level of corruption
and on places 72, 73 and 75 regarding stability. According to model (2) a
reduction of their σ to lets say the level of Thailand would increase their CPI
level by 1.39, 1.73 and 1.96 respectively corresponding to positions 49, 37 and
40 among the countries under consideration.
Interesting is the fact that the drift d in growth rates does not have any
significant impact on corruption in model (2), whereas often it is suggested in
the literature that high growth would decrease corruption. Also, including the
absolute volume of GDP per capita does not display a significant coefficient
thus the richness of a countries inhabitants does only play a minor role in
explaining corruption in this model.
Next we reduce model (2) to all significant variables to check whether the
impact of σ stays unchanged. We set up two new models (3) and (4), both
containing σ, dem95, school, protestant, and import as explaining variables
and model (4) additionally containing absgovwage. School is included as it
turns out to be the only variable which is highly correlated with absgovwage
and which changes its t-value drastically if absgovwage is excluded from model
(2).15
The reduced models show that the coefficients of σ stay pretty much unchanged
whereas its significance is even rising close to the 1%-level, indicating that the
underlying relationship is not negligible. Note that for model (4) it was even
possible to increase the adjusted R2 to 0.8045. Controlling models (2), (3) and
(4) for heteroscedasticity by deriving robust standard errors using a White cor-
rection does not change the significance levels of any of the explaining variables.
This results are encouraging, still it is not easy to show the direction of the
causality between σ and CPI. To test for that, one would need appropriate
instruments for σ. We tried to explain σ by the investment level inv and
dummies for intermediate and OECD countries, inter and OECD. These
three can explain σ with an adjusted R2 of 0.4153.16
Using predictions of σˆ in model (4) leads to model (5) where the coefficient
of σˆ changes considerably compared to the use of non-instrumented values of
σ but at least it stays significant at the 1%-level. As in any empirical research
on corruption with its many interacting factors it is still not easy to entirely
reject the hypotheses that CPI affects σ and not the other way round. Nev-
ertheless we argue that a high level of corruption might well have a negative
impact on the volume of growth in GDP but we do not see many reasons why it
15In fact, school gets significant at the 5%-level if absgovwage is excluded from model (2).
16We also tried to use normalized terms of trade variance as taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators (2002) as an instrument for σ, but it turns out that - with a ρ = 0.07 -
this variable is not sufficiently correlated to σ.
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should increase the variance of growth in GDP, especially as it turns out that
corruption levels do not change quickly over time for the most countries. Ad-
ditional support for this point of view comes from Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett
and Summers (1993). They show in their paper that much variation in growth
rates is due to random shocks and not connected to country characteristics.
Their empirical results are supported by the finding that country characteris-
tics (and also corruption levels) are strongly autocorrelated and very persistent
whereas growth rates are not. Therefore it seems much more plausible that σ
is the independent variable and not CPI and we stick to our theory that the
causality of the significant relation between CPI and σ works from σ to CPI
and not in the other direction.
Another way to check for causality would be the analysis of global recessions
or phases of high worldwide growth variance and their impact on corruption.
Higher overall variance in growth should lead to higher mean levels of corrup-
tion according to our theory. Unfortunately time series for corruption data
are hardly available, partly because the quantification of corruption is a rela-
tively new concept, and partly because the methods of compiling the indices
are changing over time.17 Also, different measures of corruption can not be
compared, because of the blurry nature of corruption definitions. Thus we had
to abandon the idea of doing an additional time series analysis with respect to
global recessions.
As said above, we expect our model to work best for democratic societies
where the people have the best means to punish politicians for opportunis-
tic behavior. Therefore we ran two additional regressions based on model
(4). Model (6) is similar to model (4) but uses only "democratic" countries,
model (7) uses only "non-democratic" countries. Again, it is not too easy to
find a reliable variable for the level of democratization of a country, as many
countries call themselves democratic or even run elections, that are definitely
non-democratic from an objective point of view. For our study we follow Barro
(1999) and refer to the indicator of political rights compiled by Gastil (1991)
and followers. Originally, Gastil classified each country from 1 (highest level
of political rights) to 7 (lowest level). We use the transformed data of Barro18,
where 1 denotes the highest level of political rights, and 0 the lowest. Countries
with a democracy index higher than 0.8 in 1995 (45 out of 75 observations)
are classified as democratic, others as non-democratic. The results (along with
the repeated results of model (4)) are shown in table 2.19 The σ-coefficient
is only significant for democratic countries and plays a minor role for non-
democratic countries, confirming our theory. In contrast, school, import and
absgovwage are only significant for non democratic countries, indicating that
17Transparency International for example explicitly warns not to use its CPI reports as
time series as the survey method and the sample changed many times.
18which we already included in model (2)
19Robust errors are used to control for multicollinearity.
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Table 2: Results of OLS regressions, differentiating between
democratic and non-democratic countries
dependent variable: CPI
Variable (4) (6) (7) (8) (9)
# of obs. 51 31 20 45 30
σ -0.1946**
(0.0805)
-0.2678***
(0.0722)
-0.0311
(0.0491)
-0.6672***
(0.1209)
-0.1474
(0.1494)
d
dem95 1.6983**
(0.6784)
9.7613*
(5.1402)
0.2614
(0.7303)
inv
school 0.0410**
(0.0169)
0.0285
(0.0232)
0.0427**
(0.0152)
ethno
protestant 0.0311***
(0.0078)
0.0270***
(0.0078)
-0.0095
(0.0192)
formerUK
import 0.0290***
(0.0076)
0.0200
(0.0138)
0.0303***
(0.0080)
federal
absgovwage 0.0486***
(0.0155)
0.0367
(0.0254)
0.0509**
(0.0234)
constant 0.6248
(0.7007)
-5.5768
(4.6524)
0.5810
(0.5847)
8.3772***
(0.5473)
4.0267***
(0.7814)
R2 0.8279 0.7656 0.8830 0.4143 0.0336
adj. R2 0.8045 0.4007 -0.0010
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, * denotes
significance at the 10%-level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
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Figure 2: Negative correlation between standard deviation of economic
output and CPI, differentiated for democratic (dcpi03) and
non-democratic (ndcpi03) countries
these variables play a minor role for the accruement of corruption in demo-
cratic countries.
To give a graphical representation, we ran two simple regressions as in
model (1), for democratic and non-democratic countries respectively. Results
(denoted by (8) for democratic and (9) for non-democratic) are shown in table
2. In the simple regression, the σ-coefficient is, as expected, only significant for
democratic countries. For them this simple model yields an R2 of 0.4143. For
non-democratic countries, the σ-coefficient is insignificant and the R2 is pretty
close to zero. In figure 2, the CPI of both democratic and non-democratic
countries is plotted against σ additional to the linear trend line of each group.
4 Conclusion
In our model we have shown that the possibility for extended corrupt ac-
tivities of politicians should be higher in countries with an unstable economic
output and that remuneration, risk-aversion and the level of control exercised
by the voters play important roles in determining the incentives to engage in
corruption. Therefore we should on average expect a higher level of corrup-
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tion in countries with a high variance in economic output. Even though the
data confirms our theoretical findings as standard deviation has a significant
and non-neglible coefficient in all relevant regression models, one should think
about other possible explanations for these results. An alternative explana-
tion would be that in unstable economies politicians are more afraid of future
stability and development because of a higher risk of institutional crisis in this
case, therefore discounting the future with a lower δ, which in turn would lead
to a more myopic behavior of "bad" politicians and hence to a higher degree
of corruption. At least, this interpretation would be consistent with the model
presented as can be seen from equation 9.
To finally rule out other explanations, an extension of the model would be
necessary. One possible addition to the theoretical model could be endoge-
nization of economic growth by explicitly modelling the interaction between
the level of corruption and the amount of investments in a economy as it is
highlighted for example by Alesina and Perotti in (1996).
On the other hand we think that our simple model and the additional
empirical findings could at least give an interesting impulse for thinking not
only about corruption affecting the path of economic output but also to take
into account the characteristics of economic output paths as one source of
corruption itself.
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Technical Appendix
In the technical appendix we want to vary the model in so far as we replace
the uniform output distribution by a normal one, such that e ∼ N(µ, σ). In
our opinion this has three advantages:
1. A normally distributed output seems to be more realistic than the quite
unnatural edge knifed uniform distribution.
2. Voters’ beliefs can be derived for every outcome e.
3. There are no regions where citizens can infer the type of the incumbent
with certainty from observing e, hence there is no perfect learning.
The stability of the economy is then expressed by the standard deviation
σ and the drift by µ. Citizens form beliefs according to equation (6) but
the probabilities now stem from the Gaussian density function for normally
distributed random variables
fl,e˜(e) =
1
e˜
√
2pi
e−
(e−d−l)2
2σ2 (13)
where l can be l or l depending on the choice of the incumbent. So there are
two possible distributions of economic outcome, depicted in figure 3.
For the equilibrium choice of I this leads to the two conditions∫ +∞
−∞
fl,e˜(e)(fl,e˜(e)− fl,e˜(e))
fl,e˜(e) + fl,e˜(e)
de >
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
(14)
for e˜ = e and e˜ = e, respectively, and f(·) being the distributions with the
gaussian form of equation 13.
To proof proposition 4 with normal distributed density functions, one has to
compare the left hand sides of equation 14 for e˜ = e and e˜ = e. If the left hand
side of (14) is smaller for e˜ = e than for e˜ = e, the proof would go through.
Unfortunately we are running into mathematical difficulties at this point,
because there does not exist any closed form solution for the integral in equa-
tion 14. Until now we did not even find any qualitative statement on compari-
son between two integrals of this type with different standard deviation values
in the gaussian functions.
One way to approach this problem is by numerical integration. At least there
exists some quite efficient algorithms for that, and we did many sample cal-
culations which confirmed our guess that proposition 4 holds true even with
norm distributed shocks.
But also a proof for the validity of 4 can be given when looking at the
behavior of the components in equation 14 :
Corruption in an unstable environment 26
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
–4 –2 2 4e 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
–4 –2 2 4e
Figure 3: Output levels for low and high variance
The integral in equation 14 consists of the citizens belief βI(e) and the
probability p(x = e|l = l1) that output e occurs when I chose l1 and the
standard deviation of shock s is e˜. Thus, the integrand in (14) can also be
written as
fl,e˜(e)
fl,e˜(e) + fl,e˜(e)
· (fl,e˜(e)− fl,e˜(e)) (15)
The first factor of expression (15) is citizens’ beliefs when observing e and
the second factor is the difference between the probabilities that this outcome
occurs when the choice is l1 = l or l1 = l.
When looking at figure 3, things get clear quickly:
The first factor is the doted sigmoid-shaped line at the top, citizens’ beliefs
βI(e).
The second factor is the difference between the right Gaussian curve (l1 =
0) and the left one (l1 = l). Thus expression (15) gives us the marginal
contribution to the integral for every e, depicted by the s-shaped light line
around the abscissa.
Therefore the integral value we are searching is the integral over this s-
shaped function. The areas between the Gaussian curves on the left and on the
right of their intersection have the same absolute value, but their contribution
to the searched integral is negative on the left side and positive on the right
side.
Because the beliefs-curve is upward sloping and always has the value 0.5 for
the e∗ where the gaussian curves intersect, the integral is positive in any case
because positive contributions right of e∗ are weighted with an higher βI(e)
than negative ones left of e∗.
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Now comparing for two different σ (a small σ in the left picture of figure 3
and a bigger one on the right side) yields a "flatter" curve βI(e), leading to a
smaller difference between positive and negative contributions to the integral,
and therefore to a lower positive integral value.20
This shows us that the condition for the choice of high corruption changes with
the variance of output even in the normally distributed case and therefore a
modified proposition 4 holds true for this case as well .
2
20In the extreme case of σ →∞ the βI(e) curve gets horizontal and the integral value of
equation (14) converges to 0, meaning that there would be no chance for learning in this
case. On the other hand, the simplified case with a discrete distribution of e leads to a step
function instead of the former sigmoid and opens the possibility for perfect learning.
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